https://tolmo.com/tags/detection/Recent content in Detection on TolmoHugoen-usSun, 06 Sep 2026 01:00:00 -0700https://tolmo.com/blog/mikrotrick-agentic-detection/Sun, 06 Sep 2026 01:00:00 -0700https://tolmo.com/blog/mikrotrick-agentic-detection/<h2 id="in-short">In short</h2> <ul> <li>MikroTrick chains two RouterOS bugs into a full, unauthenticated takeover of any MikroTik device with SSH reachable. Exploitation ran from September 2, <strong>one day before the patches and three days before the advisory</strong>.</li> <li>We reproduced the entire chain end to end from only the public advisory and the patch diff, in a single uninterrupted run: <strong>approximately three hours and roughly 110,000 tokens</strong> (the token count covers the main session; the subagent that reverse-engineered the patched binaries in the background ran on top of that), verified against both vulnerable releases. Four frontier models given the same inputs failed.</li> <li><strong>These devices no longer sit only at the edge.</strong> They wire up local AI clusters (the DGX Spark, TP&gt;2 crowd), so one compromise exposes model weights, datasets, and all east-west traffic.</li> <li><strong>Defense still investigates at ticket speed while offense iterates at agent speed</strong>, and CERT Polska cannot rule out additional undisclosed bugs. The detection section and IoC table below are the checks to run now.</li> </ul> <p>On September 5, <a href="https://cert.pl/en/posts/2026/09/vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited/">CERT Polska disclosed</a> six vulnerabilities in MikroTik RouterOS. Two of them chain into <strong>MikroTrick</strong>: a full, unauthenticated takeover of any router with SSH reachable. Attackers had been using it since at least September 2, a day before MikroTik shipped fixes and pushed a notification to every phone running its app, begging people to update.</p>